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INTRODUCTION 
A world famous artist decides to compose a comic book.  He 
has little interest in creating his own original superhero, so he 
elects to create five new stories about Superman.1  The artist 
creates these new comic books, yet he does not make copies of his 
compositions, and neglects to inform the owner of the Superman 
copyright, DC Comics, of his undertaking.  The artist instead sells 
his takes on Superman comic books to five friends, each of whom 
pay $10,000 for their very own original Superman composition. 
Five years later, the artist finds he can no longer paint or draw 
due to arthritis.  Upon learning of this unfortunate change in 
circumstance, one of the artist’s friends elects to sell his comic 
book, reasoning that he can now reap a large profit from the sale 
since the artist can no longer draw and the comic book is truly one 
of a kind.  The friend auctions off the comic book on eBay,2 
making a profit of $500,000.  This windfall piques DC Comics’ 
attention, and the comic book company sues the artist for copyright 
infringement. 
DC Comics faces a problem.3  Statute precludes lodging a 
claim of copyright infringement “unless it is commenced within 
three years after the claim accrued.”4  However, the Discovery and 
injury rules impose divergent standards governing the juncture at 
 
 1 See, e.g., Jerome Siegel & Joe Schuster, Superman, ACTION COMICS 1, at 1 
(Detective Comics, Inc. June 1938) (first appearance of Superman), reprinted in 
SUPERMAN IN ACTION COMICS ARCHIVES, VOLUME ONE 11 (Bob Kahan ed., DC Comics 
1997), available at http://superman.ws/tales2/action1/?page=1 (last visited Mar. 22, 
2007).  Citation format adopted from the Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and 
Entertainment Law Journal. Britton Payne, Comic Book Legal Citation Format, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1017, 1017–19 (2006). 
 2 eBay is an electronic auction website that allows individuals to sell goods to other 
individuals via the Internet. See eBay Home Page, http://www.ebay.com. 
 3 DC Comics could possibly sue the artist for the sale involving the eBay auction. See 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).  Under the Copyright Act, unlicensed distribution of copyrighted 
material is a cause of action. See id.  Distribution of any copy not “lawfully” made can be 
subject to a civil claim and in our case, the comic books were unlawfully made. See 
17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000).  The problem discussed herein lies with DC Comics ability to 
recover for the initial sale. 
 4 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000). 
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which claims begin to accrue.5  Depending on which rule applies, 
the statute of limitations may not have expired, thus DC Comics 
may still be able to take legal action against the artist. 
Under the discovery rule, accrual does not commence until “a 
plaintiff knows of the infringement or is chargeable with such 
knowledge,”6 but under the injury rule, a cause of action accrues at 
the time infringement occurs.7  In the aforementioned situation, if 
the federal statute of limitations for copyright infringement is 
subject to the injury rule and the claim accrued five years ago, DC 
cannot bring a case against the artist.8  If the statute of limitations 
is subject to the discovery rule, however, DC could still initiate 
proceedings so long as it did not know and could not have known 
of the infringement until it learned of the eBay auction.9 
The statute of limitations pertaining to copyright infringement 
actions is representative of a more pervasive problem that plagues 
certain federal statutes addressing time limits on filing claims.  As 
with copyright infringement legislation, many federal laws remain 
silent with respect to which rule of accrual applies in a given 
situation.  Consequently, when a federal statute remains silent on 
which rule of accrual is applicable, federal courts adopt a per se 
discovery rule.10  The United States Supreme Court’s 2001 
decision in TRW, Inc. v. Andrews11 fundamentally altered the rules 
regarding when certain accrual rules applied in the context of 
federal statutes of limitations, and left causes of action like 
copyright infringement in limbo.12 
This Note seeks to answer the question of which accrual rule 
should apply in the context of copyright infringement litigation.  
 
 5 See Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 242–43 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Stephen M. Kramarsky, Running out the Clock, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 
28, 2006, at col. 1. 
 6 Bridgeport Music, Inc., v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 7 Auscape Int’l, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 242. 
 8 See 17 U.S.C. § 507(b). 
 9 See generally Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994) 
(denying recovery for alleged infringement discovered and not sued upon with statute of 
limitations). 
 10 Id. at 27. 
 11 534 U.S. 19 (2001). 
 12 Id. at 35. 
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Part I addresses the status of the law governing both federal 
statutes of limitations in general and for copyright infringement 
prior to the Supreme Court’s TRW decision.  Part II analyzes the 
Supreme Court’s TRW decision in depth and assesses its holding in 
this pivotal case.  Part III first examines how courts have addressed 
causes of action with unclear accrual rules outside of the realm of 
copyright in the wake of the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, and 
then considers judicial treatment of copyright infringement cases 
subsequent to TRW, illuminating the differences.  Part IV, through 
statutory interpretation and examination of policy arguments for 
statutes of limitations both in general and with respect to copyright 
in particular, reaches a determination that the discovery rule is the 
appropriate rule of accrual in the context of copyright infringement 
litigation.  Part V concludes with a recommendation on how courts 
should employ the discovery rule when addressing statute of 
limitations concerns in future copyright infringement actions. 
I. PRE-TRW: MUCH SIMPLER TIMES? 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s 2001 TRW decision, a modicum 
of uniformity existed with regard to which rule of accrual in the 
context of federal statutes of limitations, despite the law’s statutory 
silence on the issue.  The statute of limitations rules for copyright 
infringement actions were largely uniform, but some notable 
exceptions nonetheless existed. 
A. Pre-TRW: Non-Copyright Infringement Causes of Action 
Where the Statute Remains Silent 
Federal law typically neglects to define when the statute of 
limitations starts to accrue for a given cause of action.13  The 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), for 
example, unambiguously states that civil actions brought under this 
legislation are subject to a statute of limitations of four years 
duration.14  The point at which the clock starts to run on this four-
year time period, however, is another matter altogether.  The 
 
 13 See id. 
 14 See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 553 (2000). 
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Supreme Court wrestled with the question of which rule of accrual 
applies in the civil RICO context in Rotella v. Wood.15  In Rotella, 
the plaintiff brought a civil RICO case against a group of 
physicians, alleging the doctors conspired to keep him at a 
psychiatric facility for their own financial interest rather than his 
own best interest.16  Doctors placed Rotella in the Brookhaven 
Psychiatric Pavilion in 1985 and discharged him in 1986.17  In 
1994, the parent company of the facility pled guilty to fraud and 
“illegal agreements between the company and its doctors.”18  In 
1997, Rotella learned of this plea agreement and brought a civil 
claim under RICO against the physicians.19  Rotella, however, had 
failed to bring an action in 1986 when his alleged injury 
occurred.20  While the Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
discovery rule is presumptively applicable when a federal statute is 
silent, it declined to extend its holding into a “pattern discovery 
rule,” deeming that such an extension would go against the 
purpose of a statute of limitations.21 
Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co.22 also recognized the 
validity of the discovery rule.  In this case, union trustees sued for 
money lost due to the company’s underreporting of hours worked 
and coal produced from 1977 through August 1979.23  The trustees 
requested documents and audited Hallmark.24  After the trustees 
completed their second audit on March 15, 1984, they learned that 
Hallmark had failed to pay approximately $70,000.25  The trustees 
then brought a breach of contract claim on March 3, 1987.26  The 
presiding court acknowledged “at least eight federal courts of 
 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. at 551 n.1. 
 17 Id. at 551. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 558–59. 
 21 Id. at 555–56.  The “pattern discovery rule” would dictate that the statute of 
limitations does not begin for a RICO civil claim until the plaintiff knew or should have 
known of the conspiracy, not just the single act. Id. at 553. 
 22 935 F.2d 336 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 23 Id. at 337. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
RAMIREZ_FINAL_050807 5/8/2007  1:07:28 PM 
2007 COPYRIGHT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 1131 
appeals have, within the last four years, agreed . . . that the 
discovery rule is the general accrual rule in federal courts.”27  The 
court added that in federal question cases, most states adopt the 
standard that absent an expressed directive from Congress 
indicating otherwise, the discovery rule should apply.28 
In the context of Rotella, the question of whether the injury or 
discovery rule applied was of little consequence, because the time 
period between the accrual and the initiation of the case exceeded 
the time frame either rule established.29  In Hallmark, however, the 
decision regarding which rule of accrual should apply was crucial 
to the trustees’ ability to sustain their claim.  Adoption of the 
injury rule would have required the plaintiffs to bring the cause of 
action within three years of Hallmark’s misrepresentation of its 
funds, before August 1982.30  Use of the discovery rule, however, 
allowed the Trustees to bring their claim without fear of 
preclusion.31 
B. Pre-TRW: The Rule of Accrual for Suits Brought under the 
Copyright Act 
Before TRW, the rule of accrual for the federal statute of 
limitations in copyright infringement actions was relatively 
uniform, yet nonetheless harbored its share of competing views.32  
Although there appeared to be a split within the Ninth Circuit prior 
to TRW regarding which rule of accrual was appropriate in the 
context of copyright infringement cases, the Second and Ninth 
Circuits generally agreed that the discovery rule should apply in 
such actions.33 
 
 27 Id. at 342. 
 28 Id. (quoting Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450 (7th Cir. 1990)). 
 29 Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 559 n.4 (2000). 
 30 See Connors v. Hallmark & Son Coal Co., 935 F.2d 336, 337, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 31 See id. at 340–41. 
 32 See Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994); Entous v. 
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1154–55 (C.D.C.A. 2001).  But see L.A. News 
Serv. v. Reuters Television Int’l, Inc., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 33 Roley, 19 F.3d at 481; Stone v. Williams, 970 F.2d 1043, 1048 (2d Cir. 1992). 
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1. The Second Circuit 
The Second Circuit maintained that the discovery rule of 
accrual should apply to statute of limitations questions in copyright 
infringement actions.34  In Stone v. Williams, Stone, the 
illegitimate daughter of country-western singer Hank Williams Sr., 
sued the singer’s son for copyright renewals under the Copyright 
Act of 1976.35  The Second Circuit held that the plaintiff’s cause of 
action accrued when the plaintiff knew or had reason to know that 
Hank Williams Sr. was her father.36  The court determined that 
Stone could not have known that Hank Williams Sr. was her father 
until 1979.37  Even under the discovery rule, the statute of 
limitations would have barred Stone’s suit, which she filed in 
1985, were it not for the fact that the alleged infringement was 
ongoing.  Because of the ongoing infringement, however, the court 
merely precluded Stone from recovering damages from 
infringement that occurred prior to 1982, three years before Stone 
filed suit, rather than foreclosing Stone’s ability to bring a claim 
altogether.38 
In the 1996 case Merchant v. Levy, the Second Circuit followed 
the precedent it established in Stone, solidifying its adoption of the 
position that the discovery rule of accrual should apply in civil 
claims filed under the Copyright Act of 1976.39  In Merchant, self-
proclaimed co-owners of a copyright attempted to assert their 
rights over those of the plaintiffs, Jimmy Merchant and Herman 
Santiago.40  The plaintiffs brought their suit in 1987.41  The court 
applied the discovery rule, and held that since the plaintiffs could 
have known of their ownership rights as early as 1961, the statute 
of limitations barred their cause of action.42  Taken together Stone 
 
 34 Merchant v. Levy, 92 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir. 1996); Stone, 970 F.2d at 1048. 
 35 970 F.2d at 1043. 
 36 Stone, 970 F.2d at 1046, 1047. 
 37 Id. at 1049, 1051. 
 38 Id. at 1051. 
 39 Merchant, 92 F.3d at 56. 
 40 Id. at 53. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. at 56.  Merchant is an interesting case because it deals with continuing 
infringement. Id.  In that respect, Merchant failed to follow Stone and did not allow for 
any claims of ownership after the statute of limitations ran. Id.  Much could be said about 
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and Merchant establish the discovery rule as the prevailing rule of 
accrual for civil claims brought under the Copyright Act of 1976 in 
the Second Circuit.43 
2. The Ninth Circuit 
Prior to TRW, the Ninth Circuit adopted the discovery rule as 
the standard rule of accrual in cases implicating statute of 
limitations concerns.  Nevertheless, some confusion lingered 
within the Ninth Circuit,  regarding whether the discovery rule was 
the appropriate rule of accrual to employ in the context of 
copyright infringement claims.44  This confusion arose largely 
from the erroneous citation of a single case: Roley v. New World 
Pictures.45  Most cases, both before and after TRW, and both 
within the Ninth Circuit and outside of it, cite Roley as the 
standard.46 
In Roley, the author of a screenplay later renamed “Sleep Tight 
Little Sister” gave the original copy of his screenplay to a friend in 
1985.47  In 1987, the author, Roley, viewed a film this same friend 
wrote entitled “Sister Sister.”48  Roley concluded that this movie 
used what was essentially his screenplay.  Without any 
compensation to or consent from Roley, “Sister Sister” aired on 
television in 1988 and 1992.49  Roley filed a copyright 
 
continuing infringement and how it affects the statute of limitations under the competing 
rules of accrual.  However, to enter into a discussion of this issue would be tangential to 
our purposes of determining what rule is appropriate. 
 43 Another case that utilized the discovery rule was Margo v. Weiss, 213 F.3d 55 (2d 
Cir. 2000), which dealt with song infringement. 
 44 See Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994); Entous v. 
Viacom Int’l, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2001).  But see L.A. News Serv. v. 
Reuters Television Int’l, 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 45 19 F.3d 479 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 46 Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481); 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing 
Roley, 19 F.3d at 481); Reuters, 149 F.3d at 992 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481); Crane 
Design, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Constr., LLC., 2006 WL 692019 (W.D. Wash) (citing Kourtis, 
419 F.3d at 999 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481)); Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 
1244, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481); Entous, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 
1155 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481). 
 47 Roley, 19 F.3d at 480. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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infringement claim on February 7, 1991.50  The presiding court 
employed the discovery rule and precluded Roley from recovering 
damages for infringement in 1987, holding that the statute of 
limitations accrued in 1987, when Roley first discovered the 
infringement through viewing “Sister Sister.”51  The court did rule, 
however, that due to continuing infringement, Roley was free to 
seek damages for any infringement that occurred on or after 
February 7, 1988.52 
Although many courts cite Roley as the controlling case on 
which rule of accrual applies in copyright infringement actions, the 
Ninth Circuit’s analysis rationalizing its decision to apply the 
discovery rule in Roley is nonexistent.  The Roley court cited two 
cases that wrestled with question of which rule of accrual should 
apply in copyright infringement cases implicating statute of 
limitations concerns, but neither of these cases contain discussions 
of the discovery rule.53  Rather, those courts only discuss tolling 
the statute of limitations through the doctrine of fraudulent 
concealment.54  Thus, in deciding Roley, the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit created precedent for applying the discovery rule. 
In Los Angeles News Service v. Reuters Television 
International, Ltd., the Ninth Circuit incorrectly cited Roley as 
precedent for using the injury rule, rather than the discovery rule, 
in determining the rule of accrual for copyright infringement 
 
 50 Id. at 481. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id.  This is three years prior to Roley bringing the cause of action. Id.  Roley is 
another continuing infringement case in which the Court chose to follow the Stone 
standard and allow for a cause of action for continuing infringement, not only for the 
initial accrual period. Id. 
 53 Taylor v. Meirek, 712 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th Cir. 1983); Wood v. Santa Barbara 
Chambers of Commerce, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 1128, 1135 (D. Nev. 1980). 
 54 See Taylor, 712 F.2d at 1118; Wood, 507 F. Supp. at 1135.  Fraudulent concealment 
is when a prospective defendant takes “active steps” to prevent a plaintiff from bringing a 
timely suit. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 891 (6th Cir. 
2004).  An argument could be made that the doctrine of fraudulent concealment helps 
determine which accrual rule is appropriate.  If an injury rule is adopted, fraudulent 
concealment can serve as a layer of protection for plaintiffs who were unable to bring suit 
with in the three-year period.  A discussion of fraudulent concealment in its entirety is 
beyond the scope of this paper because fraudulent concealment could not protect against 
the infringement that DC Comics suffered in our situation. 
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actions raising statute of limitation concerns.55  Here, the defendant 
duplicated and then profited from a copyrighted video of the 1992 
Los Angeles Riots, which stemmed from the acquittal of the police 
officers charged with beating Rodney King.56  The presiding court 
ruled that “[a] claim accrues when an act of infringement 
occurs.”57  Though the question of which rule of accrual applied 
was factually immaterial in this case, because the plaintiff would 
not be time-barred from seeking damages under either rule, the 
court unmistakably applied the injury rule rather than the discovery 
rule.58 
Despite the misunderstanding in Reuters, the Ninth Circuit 
plainly adopted the discovery rule as the applicable rule of accrual 
regarding statute of limitations questions in copyright infringement 
actions in Entous v. Viacom International, Inc.59  The court 
addressed the question of whether a contract could trump the 
statute of limitations and the accrual rule applicable to the statute.60  
Citing Roley, the court acknowledged the discovery rule as the 
appropriate rule of accrual in the context copyright infringement 
actions raising statute of limitations concerns.61 The court then 
held that parties are free to contract to a modified accrual rule and 
statute of limitations period, as long as the period is reasonable.62 
II. TRW: THE RULE OF ACCRUAL WHEN THE  
STATUTE REMAINS SILENT? 
In the 2001 case TRW v. Andrews, the Supreme Court altered 
the standard for determining the appropriate rule of accrual for a 
federal statute of limitations when the law is silent on this 
question.63  TRW involved the Fair Credit Reporting Act 
(“FCRA”), a piece of legislation that remains silent on the question 
 
 55 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 56 Id. at 990. 
 57 Id. at 992 (citing Roley, 19 F.3d at 481). 
 58 Id. 
 59 151 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (C.D. Cal. 2001). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. at 1156. 
 63 534 U.S. 19, 22 (2001). 
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of which rule of accrual applies to its provisions.64  The FCRA 
states that: 
An action to enforce any liability created under this 
subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States 
district court, without regard to the amount in controversy, 
or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, not later 
than the earlier of . . . 
(1) 2 years after the date of discovery by the plaintiff of the 
violation that is the basis for such liability; or 
(2) 5 years after the date on which the violation that is the 
basis for such liability occurs.65 
The plaintiff, Andrews, brought suit under the FCRA against 
TRW, a credit reporting agency, which disclosed Andrews’ credit 
report on multiple occasions at the behest of an identity thief.66  
TRW released credit reports to other companies at the identity 
thief’s request on July 25, 1994, September 27, 1994, October 28, 
1994 and January 3, 1995.67  Andrews learned of these disclosures 
on May 31, 199568 and filed suit against TRW on October 21, 
1996.69  Because the FCRA imposed a two-year statute of 
limitations, the two competing rules of accrual—the discovery rule 
and the injury rule—would yield divergent results on the question 
of whether the applicable statute of limitations would bar Andrews 
from seeking damages from the first of the aforementioned 
disclosures.70 
The Court held in TRW that where no explicit statement 
regarding the applicable rule of accrual exists in a federal statute, a 
court must look at the relevant statute to determine if a certain rule 
should be adopted by implication.71  While the Court did not 
definitively rule on whether courts should employ the discovery 
 
 64 Id. 
 65 15 U.S.C. § 1681p (2000). 
 66 TRW, 534 U.S. at 24. 
 67 Id. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. 
 70 15 U.S.C. § 1681p; TRW, 534 U.S. at 22. 
 71 See TRW, 534 U.S. at 28, 31. 
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rule whenever federal law is silent on the rule of accrual issue,72 it 
did overturn the Ninth Circuit rule that unless Congress expressly 
states otherwise, courts should apply the discovery rule in such 
situations.73  Although the Ninth Circuit had ruled that FCRA was 
in fact silent on the accrual issue, the Supreme Court agreed 
instead with the district court, holding that FCRA is not silent on 
this question.74  The Court noted that a subsection of the FCRA 
calls for the application of the discovery rule in actions brought 
under the FCRA.75  The relevant provision of the FCRA expressly 
states that a plaintiff must bring an action within two years of 
discovery of a violation in order to comport with the FCRA’s two-
year statute of limitation.76  The Court applied the principle of 
statutory construction—that no clause or sentence should be 
considered void or superfluous—to construe this term as 
controlling.77  The Court reasoned that if the general discovery rule 
applied under the FCRA, the specific provision mandating a two-
year discovery rule would be superfluous, and the distinction 
between the five-year period and the two-year period would be 
useless.78  Consequently, the Court held that lower courts must 
apply the injury rule of accrual to any claim brought under the 
FCRA unless the statute expressly states otherwise.79 
III. AFTERMATH OF TRW 
The Supreme Court’s TRW decision affected not only the 
Copyright Act of 1976, but also numerous other federal laws silent 
on the rule of accrual that applied to their statute of limitations 
 
 72 Id. at 27–28. 
 73 Id. at 28.  It is important to realize the distinction between a general presumption of a 
discovery rule and what some Ninth Circuit courts used as the principal for adopting a 
discovery rule.  As seen above, though most cases in the Ninth Circuit appear to just 
adopt a discovery rule, there is some precedent stating that Congress must expressly state 
that an injury rule should be used or the courts must apply a discovery rule. See id. at 27.  
TRW holds that Congress can implicitly choose what rule to adopt. See id. at 28. 
 74 Id. at 28. 
 75 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1681p. 
 76 15 U.S.C. § 1681p(1). 
 77 See id.; TRW, 534 U.S. at 31. 
 78 TRW, 534 U.S. at 28. 
 79 See id. at 33. 
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provision.80  As addressed infra, the question of how much the 
TRW decision has changed the standards for assessing federal 
statute of limitations questions remains unanswered.  While there 
appears to be little confusion in general regarding the standards 
courts now employ when adopting rules of accrual, within the 
context of copyright infringement, various federal courts have 
reached divergent outcomes when applying the standard the 
Supreme Court laid out in its TRW decision.81 
A. Post-TRW: Non-Copyright Infringement Causes of Action 
Outside of copyright infringement cases, a consensus appears 
to exist regarding the circumstances under which courts should 
employ the TRW standard to determine the appropriate rule of 
accrual for a statute of limitation provision that remains silent on 
this question.82  Additionally, outside of the statute of limitations 
context, lower courts have adopted the TRW standard for statutory 
interpretation purposes.83  With respect to litigation under the 
FCRA, for example, lower courts have followed the mandate the 
Supreme Court set down in TRW, holding that the injury rule is 
applicable rule of accrual for actions brought under this 
legislation.84 
In Claybrooks v. Primus Automotive Financial Services, Inc., a 
Tennessee district court confronted a question similar to that which 
 
 80 See, e.g., Claybrooks v. Primus Auto. Fin. Serv., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 969, 974–75 
(M.D. Tenn. 2005) (applying TRW’s analysis to determine rule of accrual for the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act); Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 
244, 246–47 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (applying TRW’s analysis to determine rule of accrual 
under the Copyright Act). 
 81 See, e.g., Crane Design, Inc. v. Pac. Coast Constr., LLC., Not Reported in F. Supp. 
2d, No. C05-251RSM, 2006 WL 692019, *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006) (declining to 
use TRW’s analysis since TRW addressed claims under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, not 
the Copyright Act); but see Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244, 246–47 (adopting TRW’s 
analysis to determine rule of accrual for the Copyright Act). 
 82 See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003); Claybrooks, 
363 F. Supp. 2d at 974–75. 
 83 Connecticut v. Spellings, 453 F. Supp. 2d 459, 475 (D. Conn. 2006). 
 84 See, e.g., Saraiva v. Citigroup, Inc., Not Reported in F. Supp. 2d, No. 01 CIV 3298 
LMM, 2002 WL 227070, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2002) (holding that TRW has established 
that a general discovery rule, other than the one specified in the statute, does not apply to 
Federal Credit Reporting Act). 
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the Supreme Court addressed in TRW, but regarding the Equal 
Credit Opportunity Act (“ECOA”) rather than the FCRA.85  In 
Claybrooks, multiple plaintiffs filed suit under the ECOA alleging 
that the defendant, Primus, maintained a discriminatory credit 
pricing system.86  While the plaintiffs admitted that Primus first 
subjected them to this pricing system in 1999, they did not 
commence their litigation until 2002.87  Consequently, the district 
court had to undertake a two-step analysis of the plaintiffs’ claims.  
The court first had to determine the appropriate rule of accrual for 
the two-year statute of limitations the ECOA established, since the 
legislation itself remained silent on the issue.  Next, using the 
applicable rule of accrual, it had to ascertain whether the plaintiffs 
were time-barred from filing suit under the ECOA.88  The court 
acknowledged that in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
TRW, no presumption that the discovery rule was the proper rule of 
accrual existed.89  The court then looked to the text of the ECOA 
which states in pertinent part: 
(f) Jurisdiction of courts; time for maintenance of action; 
exceptions 
Any action under this section may be brought in the 
appropriate United States district court without regard to 
the amount in controversy, or in any other court of 
competent jurisdiction. No such action shall be brought 
later than two years from the date of the occurrence of the 
violation, except that— 
(1) whenever any agency having responsibility for 
administrative enforcement under section 1691c of this title 
commences an enforcement proceeding within two years 
from the date of the occurrence of the violation, 
(2) whenever the Attorney General commences a civil 
action under this section within two years from the date of 
the occurrence of the violation, 
 
 85 363 F. Supp. 2d at 971, 973. 
 86 Id. at 971. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 973, 977–983. 
 89 Id. at 974–75. 
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then any applicant who has been a victim of the 
discrimination which is the subject of such proceeding or 
civil action may bring an action under this section not later 
than one year after the commencement of that proceeding 
or action.90 
After analyzing this portion of the statute, the district court 
concluded that the ECOA is not silent on the question of the 
appropriate rule of accrual, and that the phrase “date of 
occurrence” renders the ECOA’s two-year statue of limitations 
subject to the injury rule of accrual.91  The court also noted that a 
provision of the ECOA expressly creates an exception to the 
applicability of the injury rule.92  The court concluded that the 
phrase “except that” in the ECOA explicitly carves out an 
exception to the general “date of occurrence” rule and 
simultaneously precludes the applicability of the discovery rule of 
accrual to the ECOA’s two-year statute of limitations.93 
The First Circuit, however, adhered expressly to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in TRW in it addressed the question of which rule 
of accrual was proper in the context of the two-year statute of 
limitations contained within the Federal Tort Claims Act 
(“FTCA”).94  In Skwira v. United States, the plaintiffs sued the 
federal government after a nurse in a Veterans Affairs Medical 
Center murdered their family member.95  The death occurred in 
1996, a criminal proceeding concluded with the conviction of the 
nurse in 1998, and the plaintiffs filed their civil suit in 1999.96  The 
statute of limitations provision of the FTCA states in pertinent part: 
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever 
barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate 
Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or 
unless action is begun within six months after the date of 
mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final 
 
 90 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 91 Claybrooks, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 975, 977 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f)). 
 92 Id. at 976. 
 93 Id. at 975–76. 
 94 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1927); Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 95 Skwira, 344 F.3d at 67. 
 96 Id. at 67, 70. 
RAMIREZ_FINAL_050807 5/8/2007  1:07:28 PM 
2007 COPYRIGHT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 1141 
denial of the claim by the agency to which it was 
presented.97 
The court analyzed FTCA, but in contrast to the statutes and 
cases discussed supra, it concluded that no express provision 
indicating which rule, or rules, of accrual should apply in the 
context of the FTCA existed within the legislation.98  The court 
ended its analysis of legislative intent with this finding, and moved 
on to examine other laws in which the discovery rule is the 
appropriate accrual scheme.99  The court ultimately held that 
claims under the FTCA are subject to the discovery rule for statute 
of limitations accrual purposes,100  but ruled that the plaintiffs’ 
were nonetheless time-barred from filing claims under the FTCA 
since they could have filed a claim in 1996, once the autopsy 
determined that their family member died of unnatural causes.101 
From these cases, it appears that the question of whether a 
lower court will apply the Supreme Court’s TRW rule when 
interpreting the appropriate rule of accrual for a given statute of 
limitation hinges upon the text of the legislation at issue.  If a 
statute is truly silent on the question of the appropriate rule of 
accrual as FTCA is, then courts will apply the discovery rule,102 
but if a statute contains explicit exceptions to a given accrual rule 
like FCRA and ECOA, courts will employ the injury rule.103 
 
 97 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2000). 
 98 Skwira, 344 F.3d at 74 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b)).  The Court points out that the 
law of torts is a creature of common law and not born from statutes. Id. at 74–75. 
 99 The Court, though finished with TRW, continued to assess which rule to adopt.  The 
Court assessed other areas of law where a discovery rule is used such as medical 
malpractice and latent disease. Id. at 73.  The Court looked at two reasons that should 
instruct a court to adopt a discovery rule. Id.  When it is possible that the plaintiff is left 
without a remedy due to the cause of action arising after the statutory period and when 
the nature of the cause of action relies on someone’s knowledge, other than the 
plaintiff’s. See id. 
 100 Id. at 75. 
 101 Id. at 81. 
 102 See id. 
 103 For FCRA analysis, see TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001).  For ECOA 
analysis, see Claybrooks v. Primus Auto. Fin. Servs., Inc., 363 F. Supp. 2d 969 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2005). 
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B. Post-TRW: The Rule of Accrual for Copyright Infringement 
The aforementioned uniformity regarding rule of accrual 
analysis in the wake of the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, 
however, has yet to pervade the realm of statute of limitations 
concerns in copyright infringement actions.104  A portion of the 
Second Circuit has adopted the injury rule in the context of such 
actions,105 while the Ninth Circuit has in contrast adopted the 
discovery rule.106  The Sixth Circuit has adopted the discovery rule 
as well, using Roley as its controlling authority.107  The Second 
Circuit, however, appears to be the only circuit that has employed 
the rule of accrual analysis framework the Supreme Court laid out 
in TRW; the other circuits mention TRW only in passing.108 
1. The Second Circuit 
Following the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, district courts in 
the Second Circuit opted to continue to adhere to the discovery 
rule regarding statute of limitations questions in the context 
copyright infringement actions.  In 2004, Judge Kaplan delivered a 
decision reversing this trend.109  In 2006, courts in the Southern 
District of New York decided two copyright infringement cases in 
which the injury rule prevailed.110 
In 2002, a court in the Southern District of New York 
reasserted its desire to apply the discovery rule in Sapon v. DC 
Comics.111  In 2004, however, Judge Kaplan, also sitting in the 
 
 104 See Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 241–49 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004).  But see Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 105 See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 241–49. 
 106 See Kourtis, 419 F.3d at 999–1000. 
 107 See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, LTD., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 
2004) (citing Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 108 See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244.  But see Crane Design v. Pacific Coast Constr., 
No. C05-251RSM, 2006 WL 692019, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 17, 2006). 
 109 See Sapon v. DC Comics, No. 00 CIV. 8992(WHP), 2002 WL 485730, at *5 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002).  But see Auscape 409 F. Supp. 2d at 241–49. 
 110 Kwan v. Schlein, 441 F. Supp. 2d. 491, 499 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Roberts v. Keith, No. 
04 Civ. 10079 (CSH), 2006 WL 547252, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2006) (using the injury 
rule and citing Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 247). 
 111 Sapon, 2006 WL 485730 at *5.  Sapon sued DC Comics for copyright infringement 
on his character, the “Black Bat.” Id.  Because the court employed the discovery rule, 
Sapon could only bring a cause of action for infringement that occurred during or after 
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Southern District of New York, handed down a decision that may 
change both the manner in which courts address rule of accrual 
concerns in the realm of copyright infringement actions and the 
Copyright Act of 1976 forever.112  In Auscape International v. 
National Geographic Society, Judge Kaplan adopted the injury rule 
in place of the discovery rule in a copyright infringement action.113  
In Auscape, freelance writers and photographers filed suit against 
National Geographic over its practice of compiling back issues of 
its publication in microform and electronic media editions.114  
Judge Kaplan found that any direct infringement on the part of 
National Geographic occurred on or before 1993,115 but that 
ProQuest, another defendant in the case, infringed the plaintiffs’ 
copyrights until 1996.116  The plaintiffs filed suit on January 31, 
2002,117 asserting that they could not have known of the 
infringement until the year they commenced their litigation.118  The 
plaintiffs’ ability to persist with their claims hinged upon the 
question of which rule of accrual applied to the statute of 
limitations for copyright infringement actions.119 
Judge Kaplan commenced his analysis by distinguishing the 
case at issue from the Merchant and Stone decisions, holding that 
those cases dealt with co-ownership of a copyright, rather than 
infringement.120  Next, Judge Kaplan acknowledged that while 
federal courts, as a general rule, had previously applied the 
discovery rule when a given statute of limitation remained silent on 
the question of an appropriate complementary rule of accrual, the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in TRW fundamentally altered this 
precedent.121  Judge Kaplan noted that “TRW requires examination 
 
1999. Id.  Unrelated to the accrual rule issue, Sapon was unsuccessful in all of his claims 
and was actually found to be the infringing party. Id. at *7. 
 112 See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 241–249. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. at 237. 
 115 Id. at 241. 
 116 Id. at 242. 
 117 Id. at 241. 
 118 Id. at 242. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. at 243. 
 121 Id. at 244. 
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of the statutory structure and legislative history in determining 
whether a discovery or injury rule should apply . . . .”122 
While Judge Kaplan observed that the statute of limitations 
provision in the Copyright Act of 1976 states that “[n]o civil action 
shall be maintained under the provisions of this title unless it is 
commenced within three years after the claim accrued,”123 his 
analysis of the statutory text itself ended with this concise 
reflection.  Judge Kaplan reasoned that in contrast to the statute of 
limitations provision of the FCRA, which the Supreme Court 
confronted in TRW, the statute of limitations clause in the 
Copyright Act of 1976 contained no exceptions or other alternative 
provisos that might lead a court to deduce that the legislation’s 
statute of limitations favors one rule of accrual over another.124  
Unlike the Skwira court, however, Judge Kaplan did not conclude 
his analysis at this juncture, but rather delved into an examination 
of the legislative intent behind the Copyright Act of 1976’s statute 
of limitations clause.125 
Congress first subjected civil copyright infringement actions to 
a statute of limitations provision when it amended the Copyright 
Act in 1957.126  Judge Kaplan looked at the hearing notes relating 
to this 1957 amendment in an effort to ascertain Congress’ intent 
in amending the Copyright Act to include a statute of limitations 
proviso.127  Judge Kaplan concluded that Congress sought through 
its 1957 amendment of the Copyright Act to establish a uniform 
timeframe within which plaintiffs could bring copyright 
infringement actions, since the Copyright Act was at that time 
subject to state law and thus vulnerable to manipulation through 
forum shopping.128  Judge Kaplan gleaned from the Senate 
committee notes on the Copyright Act amendment that Congress 
believed a three-year statute of limitations provided lawful 
 
 122 Id. 
 123 17 U.S.C. § 507(b) (2000); Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
 124 Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. at 245; Act of Aug. 19, 1957, 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1961, 1961 (discussing the 
1957 amendment to the Copyright Act which provided a statute of limitations for civil 
copyright actions). 
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copyright holders with a sufficient amount of time to commence 
legal action following infringement of their copyrights.129  Judge 
Kaplan further stated that it appeared from the Senate committee 
notes that state laws at the time of the 1957 Copyright Act 
amendment all employed the injury rule for statute of limitations 
accrual purposes, and that Congress’ goal in amending the federal 
Copyright Act was increased certainty.130  Employing the 
discovery rule for statute of limitations accrual calculations in the 
context of copyright infringement actions, Judge Kaplan noted, 
would consequently run contrary to the legislative intent behind 
Congress’ 1957 amendment of the Copyright Act.131  Judge Kaplan 
concluded his analysis by distinguishing copyright infringement 
actions from copyright ownership disputes, noting that ownership 
disputes do not arise until a co-owner of a copyright attempts to 
exercise exclusive rights over a jointly owned piece of intellectual 
property.132  Following his detailed analysis of Congress’ historical 
legislative intent regarding the imposition of a statute of limitations 
in copyright infringement actions, Judge Kaplan held that the 
injury rule should apply to statute of limitations accrual tabulations 
in the realm of copyright infringement actions, and that adoption of 
this rule barred all of the plaintiffs’ claims in the case.133 
Recent Southern District of New York cases echo Judge 
Kaplan’s holding in Auscape.134  In Kwan v. Schlein, the court 
concluded that the case at hand concerned solely an issue of co-
ownership of a copyright, and consequently applied the discovery 
rule.135  In Roberts v. Keith, the court, grappling with an 
infringement claim, cited Auscape and employed the injury rule.136 
 
 129 Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 245; 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1962. 
 130 Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 245–46. 
 131 Id. at 247. 
 132 Id.  The ownership provision is located in a separate section of the Copyright Act. 17 
U.S.C. § 201 (2006).  Under the Copyright Act, any claim brought is subject to the same 
statute of limitations. Id. at § 507. 
 133 See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 247. 
 134 Kwan v. Schlein, 441 F. Supp. 2d 491, 498–99 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Roberts v. Keith, 
No. 04 Civ. 10079 (CSH), 2006 WL 547252, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 2006) (using the 
injury rule and citing Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 247). 
 135 Kwan, 441 F. Supp. 2d at 498–99. 
 136 Roberts, 2006 WL 547252 at *3. 
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2. The Ninth Circuit 
In contrast to the Second Circuit, the Ninth Circuit applies the 
discovery rule when confronted with statute of limitations accrual 
questions in the copyright infringement realm.137  As discussed in 
Part I(B)(ii) infra, however, the Ninth Circuit’s misguided citation 
of Roley in Reuters produced a slight hiccup in the circuit’s 
jurisprudence on this issue.  This irregularity came to a head in 
2002, when a district court in the Central District of California, 
subject to Ninth Circuit review on appeal, cited Reuters and 
applied the incorrect rule of accrual in a copyright infringement 
action.138  Application of the appropriate rule of accrual, however, 
proved inconsequential in this case after the court concluded that 
the defendants did not infringe on the plaintiffs’ copyright.139 
In 2005, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that the discovery rule governs statute of limitations 
accrual calculations in copyright infringement actions.140  In 
Kourtis v. Cameron, the plaintiffs filed a copyright infringement 
claim against the makers of the film Terminator 2.141  The 
plaintiffs’ claim related to the shape shifting ability of the main 
character in their proposed film, The Minotaur.142  To wit, the lead 
villain in Terminator II possessed the same shape-shifting ability 
as the main character in The Minotaur.143  The plaintiffs proposed 
The Minotaur to the defendants in 1989, and in 1991 the 
defendants released Terminator 2, which the plaintiffs contended 
infringed on their copyrighted work.144  The court, applying the 
discovery rule for accrual purposes, held that while the statute of 
limitations barred the plaintiffs from recovering for infringement 
stemming from the initial release of Terminator 2, the plaintiffs 
remained free to pursue claims relating to any infringement that 
 
 137 Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 999 (9th Cir. 2005). But see Newton v. Diamond, 
204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1260 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Los Angeles News Serv. v. Reuters 
Television Int’l et al., 149 F.3d 987, 992 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
 138 Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1260. 
 139 Id. at 1260. 
 140 Kourtis, 419 F.3d at 999. 
 141 Id. at 993. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
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occurred within the three years immediately preceding the filing of 
their suit.145  Tellingly, the court never mentioned TRW in its 
decision, but it did cite Roley, and did so without conducting a 
post-TRW analysis.146 
In 2006, the Western District of Washington, subject to the 
Ninth Circuit for appellate review, followed Kourtis in Crane 
Design, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Construction, LLC.147  In this case the 
plaintiff, Crane, sued for infringement on the copyrights it held for 
its building designs.148  The defendant construction company used 
Crane’s designs in conjunction with buildings they worked on 
from 2001 into 2003.149  Crane did not learn of the defendant’s 
infringing use of its designs until a 2003 phone call.150  The court, 
citing Roley and Kourtis, applied the discovery rule and held that 
since the statute of limitations had not accrued, Crane was free to 
pursue its infringement claims pertaining to actions the defendant 
undertook prior to 2003.151  In contrast to the Kourtis court, the 
Crane court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s TRW ruling, but 
distinguished the decision as applicable only within the framework 
of the FCRA, and thus not controlling in the context of cases 
brought under Copyright Act.152 
3. The Sixth Circuit 
Like the Ninth Circuit, the Sixth Circuit has adopted the 
discovery rule when calculating statute of limitations accruals in 
copyright infringement actions in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
TRW decision.153  In Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, 
Ltd., the plaintiff filed suit alleging infringement of music 
copyrights it held.154  While the Sixth Circuit never ruled on the 
question of when the infringement began, it found that the 
 
 145 See id. at 999–1000. 
 146 Id. 
 147 2006 WL 692019 (W.D. Wash.). 
 148 Id. at *1–2. 
 149 Id. at *2. 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. at *4. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 154 Id. at 885–86. 
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defendants did not engage in any infringement after 1998.155  
Although the court applied the discovery rule, even the accrual 
calculation tabulated under this method barred the plaintiffs from 
persisting with their claims.156  The court did not analyze TRW, 
and instead simply cited Roley, a pre-TRW case, as the controlling 
authority on the accrual rule question.157 
IV. WHICH RULE IS PROPER? 
Up to this point, this Note has addressed what has essentially 
been a battle between two circuits.  Both the Second and Ninth 
Circuits wrestled with federal statutes of limitations that remain 
silent on the question of which accrual rule applies under their 
auspices.  In the context of the accrual rule applicable in copyright 
infringement actions, the two circuits are at an impasse.  The 
Second Circuit conducts the most thorough analysis and addresses 
the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, while the Ninth Circuit’s 
attention to TRW is essentially non-existent. 
A. Application of TRW by Courts: What Does TRW Stand For and 
What Should it Stand For? 
The case law splits into three various analyses of the Supreme 
Court’s TRW decision and three different interpretations of which 
accrual rule should apply when a federal state of limitations 
remains silent on this issue.158  It is apparent from other court’s 
construal of TRW that two of these interpretations are likely more 
correct than the third. 
1. The Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Interpretation 
The Ninth Circuit has yet to consider how the Supreme Court’s 
TRW ruling applies in the realm of copyright infringement actions.  
In Crane, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the Supreme 
 
 155 Id. at 889. 
 156 See id. at 889–91. 
 157 Id. at 889. 
 158 See Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005); Skwira v. United States, 344 
F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2003).  But see Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 
235 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
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Court’s TRW ruling only applied to the FCRA, and does not 
control in the domain of Copyright Act.159  The Supreme Court 
never stated in TRW that its analysis of the FCRA should apply in 
all situations in which a statute of limitations remains silent on the 
question of the appropriate complementary rule of accrual.160  
Moreover, the Court never rejected the general presumption that 
the discovery rule applies when a statute of limitation remains 
silent on the accrual rule question.161  The Court only held that the 
Ninth Circuit was wrong to presume that Congress must enact 
explicit legislation in order to counteract this presumption.162  
While the Supreme Court expressly overruled only one method of 
assessing accrual rules, the methodology the Supreme Court 
employed in TRW applies to all statutes of limitations that remain 
silent on the question of which rule of accrual applies under their 
auspices.163  Finally, Roley, the Ninth Circuit’s controlling 
authority on the question of which accrual applies in the context of 
copyright infringement when a statute of limitations remains silent 
on the issue, fails to conduct any analysis whatsoever of why the 
discovery rule should apply over the injury rule.164 
2. The First Circuit’s Interpretation: The Narrow TRW 
In Skwira v. United States, the First Circuit deferred to the 
Supreme Court’s TRW decision, and consequently limited its 
holding to statutes containing written exceptions to a given accrual 
rule.165  The First Circuit in Skwira and the Supreme Court in TRW 
employed highly similar analytical methodologies.166  In Skwira, 
 
 159 Crane Design, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Const., LLC., 2006 WL 692019 at *4 (W.D. 
Wash.). 
 160 See generally TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19 (2001) (noting that the FCRA 
specifies a limited discovery exception in the statute, which implicitly demonstrates 
Congress’ intent to exclude the application of a general discovery rule). 
 161 Id. at 25–26. 
 162 Id. 
 163 See generally id. 
 164 See Roley v. New World Pictures, Ltd., 19 F.3d 479, 481 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 165 Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 74 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 166 Compare TRW, 534 U.S. at 31 (enactment of discovery rule as an exception indicates 
congressional intent to apply injury rule as general rule), with Skwira, 344 F.3d (absence 
of such an exception in the statute permits application of the discovery rule as the general 
rule). 
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the First Circuit, after finding no express exceptions in the statute 
at issue, adopted the general presumption favoring applicability of 
the discovery rule, which the Supreme Court had yet to reject at 
that juncture.167  The First Circuit’s narrow interpretation limits 
analysis in the mold of TRW to legislative intent via statutory 
construction only, and dispenses with examination of legislative 
committee notes.  The First Circuit’s treatment of accrual rule 
questions remains valid because it shares its analytical 
methodology with the Supreme Court’s TRW decision, and 
diverges only in its application of a general rule that the Supreme 
Court never explicitly overruled.168 
3. The Second Circuit’s Interpretation: The Broad TRW 
In Auscape, a district court in the Southern District of New 
York, subject to the Second Circuit in the event of appellate 
review, took its analysis of TRW a step further than Skwira when it 
employed committee notes to assess Congress’ legislative intent.169  
This Southern District methodology flows logically from the 
Supreme Court’s TRW decision, wherein the Court undertook an 
analysis of Congress’ legislative intent in enacting the FCRA 
before it concluded that Congress intended the injury accrual rule 
to apply to the FCRA’s statute of limitations.170 
4. The Proper Application of TRW 
Of these interpretations of TRW, the First Circuit’s is the most 
accurate and astute.  TRW does not resolve the question of which 
accrual rule applies when a statute of limitations remains silent on 
the issue.171  The Supreme Court could have easily rejected the 
presumption favoring application of the discovery rule outright in 
 
 167 Skwira, 344 F.3d at 75. 
 168 See id.  The Court in TRW looked at the statute and then made its decision.  There is 
some dicta referring to legislative intent but that was not part of the Court’s analysis. See 
TRW, 534 U.S. at 31–33. 
 169 Auscape Int’l v. Nat’l Geographic Soc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 235, 244–47 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 170 TRW, 534 U.S. at 33 (“As TRW notes, however, Congress also heard testimony 
urging it to enact a statute of limitations that runs from ‘the date on which the violation is 
discovered’ but declined to do so.”). 
 171 TRW, 534 U.S. at 27. 
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TRW, but it did not go that far.172  This is not to say that if the 
Court were to decide a question of the applicable accrual rule for a 
given statute of limitations they would decline to undertake an 
Auscape-like analysis, but extrapolating the Court’s TRW holding 
beyond the limited context in which the decision applies is 
somewhat presumptuous.  If a court were to analyze a statute of 
limitations silent on the question of an applicable complementary 
rule of accrual using the Auscape methodology, it would flounder 
if it could not rely on information capable of providing insight into 
Congress’s legislative intent.  Additionally, to borrow an argument 
from TRW, adoption of the Auscape court’s analytical 
methodology would negate the still-valid general presumption 
favoring applicability of the discovery rule when a statute of 
limitations remains silent on the accrual rule question.  The 
Supreme Court plainly did not intend to overrule this general 
presumption favoring applicability of the discovery rule, for if it 
did, it would have expressly stated as much, and proffered the 
analytical framework it employed in TRW as the only means of 
determining the appropriate accrual rule for a given statute of 
limitation. 
While the Auscape court’s analytical methodology may 
constitute a well-reasoned extension of the Supreme Court’s TRW 
decision, it also contradicts itself.  The Auscape court suggested 
that in the context of ownership, rather than infringement, actions 
brought under the Copyright Act, the discovery accrual rule might 
still constitute good law.173  The court, employing a two-pronged 
analysis of both statutory construction and legislative intent, held 
that the injury rule of accrual rule applies in the context of 
copyright infringement actions, yet no provision in the Copyright 
Act states that the Act’s statute of limitations provision treats 
ownership claims and infringement claims differently.174  
Consequently, the Auscape court erred when it stated that the 
discovery rule might apply to copyright ownership claims, but not 
to copyright infringement claims.  While the Auscape court may 
have over stepped its bounds, however, this does not detract from 
 
 172 Id. 
 173 Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 243–44. 
 174 17 U.S.C. § 507 (2000). 
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the fact that the court’s conclusion that the injury rule is the 
appropriate accrual rule in the context of copyright infringement 
actions was accurate, or that its detailed analysis of both statutory 
construction and legislative intent was enlightening. 
B. Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Intent: How Should 
Courts Interpret the Copyright Amendment of 1957? 
No room for statutory interpretation exists within the Copyright 
Act regarding the rule of accrual that applies to the Act’s statute of 
limitations.  The Auscape court was astute in stating that the text of 
the Act was “not so illuminating” on the rule of accrual.175  Room 
does exist, however, for analysis of Congress’ intent regarding the 
appropriate rule of accrual, and that intent, gleaned through 
legislative notes, appears to mandate adoption of the injury rule in 
the context of the Copyright Act’s statute of limitations.176  On the 
subject of legislative intent, the Auscape court made it quite clear 
that Congress’ intent in 1957 was to correct the lack of certainty 
that pervaded copyright law at the time.177  Pre-1957 copyright 
infringement cases clearly indicate the uncertainty that pervaded 
the relationship between the statute of limitations and copyright 
law at that time.178  The ambiguous law governing statute of 
limitations accrual questions in the context of copyright claims 
prior to 1957 read: “an action for an infringement is governed by 
the limitations existing for the class of actions to which it belongs 
in the state where it is brought.”179  Before 1957, the injury rule 
appeared to serve as the dominant accrual rule in copyright 
infringement claims, regardless of the state.180  Since Congress 
remained silent on the applicable rule of accrual in 1957, it is 
 
 175 Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
 176 See 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N 1962 (“[D]ue to the nature of publication of works of art . . . 
generally the person injured . . . can easily ascertain any infringement . . . [t]he committee 
agrees that 3 years is an appropriate period for a uniform statute of limitations for civil 
copyright actions and that it would provide an adequate opportunity for the injured party 
to commence his action.”). 
 177 Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 245. 
 178 See, e.g., Local Trademarks, Inc. v. Price, 170 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1948); Pathe Exch., 
Inc. v. Dalke Universal Film Exchs., Inc., 49 F.2d 161 (4th Cir. 1931). 
 179 Local Trademarks, 170 F.2d at 717. 
 180 Id. at 719. 
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logical to assume that it accepted the status quo at the time: the 
injury rule.181  Moreover, Congress remains free to change the 
statute of limitations provision in the Copyright Act, to mandate 
application of a specific rule of accrual if it deems such action 
necessary.  Interestingly, few copyright infringement cases 
implicating accrual of the statute of limitations arose between 1957 
and 1976.182  One case decided during this period adopted the 
injury rule as the appropriate rule of accrual in the context of the 
Copyright Act.183  Until recently, the status quo accrual rule in 
copyright actions implicating statute of limitations concerns 
appears to have been the injury rule. 
C. Policy Considerations: Should Policy Dictate Which Rule 
Applies to Copyright Infringement? 
Policy considerations offer some insight as to which accrual 
rule courts should adopt when statute of limitations concerns arise 
in copyright infringement actions.  In Skwira, the First Circuit 
completed its TRW analysis without confronting any explicit 
exceptions within the pertinent statute of limitations that might 
govern application of a given accrual rule, although the court did 
address policy concerns when it held the discovery rule was a 
proper accrual rule in the context of the FTCA.184  Courts are free 
to consider policy concerns such as fairness to the defendant, 
 
 181 See Auscape, 409 F. Supp. 2d at 246 (explaining that Congress intended the statute 
of limitations to run upon infringement and not upon discovery). 
 182 See, e.g., Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183, 
1188 n.12 (2d Cir. 1975) (declining to address statute of limitations as appellee’s 
alternate grounds for dismissal because of court’s decision regarding infringement); 
Telex Corp. v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 912 (10th Cir. 1975) (the trial court 
held that the statute of limitations did not apply “because Telex had fraudulently 
concealed the fact that they had misappropriated IBM’s trade secrets”); Prather v. Neva 
Paperbacks, Inc., 446 F.2d 338, 339 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that the statute of 
limitations barred plaintiff’s action); Smith v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 425 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 
1970) (discussing statutes of limitation and continuing torts); Gordon v. Vincent 
Youmans, Inc., 358 F.2d 261, 266 (2d Cir. 1965) (statute of limitations issue was not 
before the court on appeal). 
 183 See Baxter v. Curtis Indus., Inc., 201 F. Supp. 100, 101 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (holding 
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the date of the last act of infringement). 
 184 See Skwira v. United States, 344 F.3d 64, 67, 73–74 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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efficiency, and institutional legitimacy185 while weighing which 
accrual rule is appropriate in the context of the Copyright Act’s 
statute of limitations provision.  While Suzette Malveaux 
addressed policy concerns in the context of statute of limitations 
questions related to the issue of reparations,186  applying these 
same considerations in the realm of the Copyright Act may help 
illuminate the appropriate accrual rule for copyright infringement 
litigation. 
1. Fairness to the Defendant 
Three interests are prominent in ensuring fairness for the 
defendant: “(1) providing repose for the defendant; (2) promoting 
accuracy in fact finding; and (3) curtailing plaintiff misconduct.”187 
a) Providing Repose for Defendants 
Individuals need certainty and finality.188  Defendants should 
not need to concern themselves with the prospect of financial 
burdens arising from potential lawsuits indefinitely.189  Returning 
to the hypothetical case of the artist from the introduction to this 
Note, one might recall that one of the friends who purchased the 
artist’s interpretation of a Superman comic book became 
financially unstable 10 years after he purchased the artist’s creation 
and elected to sell the comic on eBay.190  Application of the 
discovery rule would not bar DC Comics from commencing 
copyright infringement litigation against the artist for his original 
infringement of the company’s Superman-related copyrights.  
Adoption of the injury rule, however, would bar DC Comics from 
litigating a claim against the artist stemming from his original 
infringement.  It is difficult to fathom that permitting DC Comics 
to sue the artist twenty years after the date of the original 
infringement would promote fairness for any defendant.  The 
 
 185 Suzette Malveaux, Statutes of Limitations: A Policy Analysis in the Context of 
Reparations Litigation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 73–81 (2005). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. at 75. 
 188 See id. 
 189 Id. at 76. 
 190 See supra Introduction. 
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injury rule better serves the interest of offering repose to potential 
copyright infringement defendants. 
b) Promoting Accuracy in Evidence 
Promoting accuracy in evidence by requiring a plaintiff to 
bring his claim as soon as possible constitutes an equally important 
interest.191  In the artist hypothetical, the evidence is easily 
accessible and the certainty of infringement is unquestionable.  In 
most copyright infringement cases, availability of physical 
evidence of infringement is a non-issue.  While in a criminal or 
personal injury case evidence may degrade or even disappear 
altogether over time, in a copyright infringement action access to 
physical evidence of infringement—whether the tangible evidence 
of infringement is a comic book as in the hypothetical, a song as in 
Bridgeport, or a film as in Kourtis—continues indefinitely.192  
Consequently, neither the discovery rule nor the injury rule harms 
the interest of promoting accurate evidence. 
c) Preventing Plaintiff Misconduct 
Ascertaining the appropriate accrual for copyright infringement 
litigation requires analysis of three methods of preventing plaintiff 
misconduct: “(1) preventing fraud; (2) promoting diligence; and 
(3) leveling the playing field between the parties.”193 
i. Fraud 
Courts can prevent plaintiff misconduct by preventing fraud.  
They can prevent fraud by proscribing plaintiffs from filing claims 
premised on evidence that the courts cannot test for accuracy.194  
While neither the discovery rule nor the injury rule unequivocally 
prevent fraud, the latter rule is better suited to accomplish this aim 
in that it forces plaintiffs to file claims closer to the date of 
infringement.  Admittedly, a plaintiff could file a claim ten years 
after an instance of infringement relying on perfectly legitimate 
 
 191 Id. 
 192 See, e.g., Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005); Bridgeport Music, Inc. 
v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883 (6th Cir. 2004). 
 193 See Malveaux, supra note 185, at 77. 
 194 See id. 
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evidence, but evidence less than three years old is more likely to be 
reliable than evidence ten years old.  Consequently, imposition of a 
concrete time frame within which a plaintiff must commence a 
copyright infringement action under the injury rule might help to 
prevent instances of plaintiff fraud. 
ii. Diligence on the Part of the Plaintiff 
Diligence on the part of the plaintiff “stimulate[s] activity and 
punish[es] negligence.”195  The injury rule forces plaintiffs to 
remain vigilant of their intellectual property.  Sophisticated 
copyright holders, however, would exhibit diligence regardless of 
which accrual rule governs copyright infringement actions.  
Through close monitoring of all transactions related to their 
copyrights, such parties would likely learn of any infringement 
shortly after it occurred.  Consequently, such parties would possess 
the knowledge necessary to commence litigation well before the 
Copyright Act’s three-year statute of limitations precluded them 
from filing claims, regardless of whether the discovery rule or the 
injury rule controlled accrual calculations. 
The prevalence of the Internet further blurs the importance of 
determining which accrual rule applies in the context of copyright 
infringement actions.  The Internet’s precipitation of dramatic 
increases in both the quantity of information available to diligent 
copyright holders and the speed of availability has enabled such 
watchful parties to monitor use of their copyrighted property with 
relative ease.  Under the discovery rule, accrual against a statute of 
limitations commences once a potential plaintiff knows or should 
reasonably know of an instance of unlawful conduct.196  Diligent 
copyright holders will know, or should reasonably know, of an 
infringing use as soon as news of such a use appears on the 
Internet.  Consequently, as technology steadily advances, the 
difference between discovery and injury rule accrual calculations 
diminishes.  Noted legal scholar Lawrence Lessig asserts that in 
this age of new technology, Digital Rights Management (“DRM”) 
 
 195 Id. at 78 (quoting Wood v. Carpenter, 101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879)). 
 196 See Bridgeport Music, Inc., v. Diamond Time, Ltd., 371 F.3d 883, 889 (6th Cir. 
2004). 
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will strictly enforce copyright compliance on the Internet.197  
Lessig fears that as DRM advances and its prominence increases, 
enforcement of copyrights will become easier and eventually so 
pervasive that it will destroy the public domain.198  Lessig raises 
the specter of expanding, increasingly restrictive copyright laws 
that will—with assistance from DRM—make it easier for 
copyright holders to police infringement.199 
In the hypothetical situation regarding the artist’s unauthorized 
creation of Superman comic books, however, it would have been 
nearly impossible for even a party as vigilant and sophisticated as 
DC Comics to learn of the five infringing works until one of them 
turned up on  eBay.  Adherence to the injury rule in copyright 
infringement actions would preclude even the most diligent 
plaintiffs from commencing litigation premised on the original 
infringement in such a situation.  Even under the injury rule, 
however, DC Comics could still move to enjoin the artist’s friend 
from proceeding with the eBay auction, and file suit to curtail any 
subsequent infringement of its Superman copyrights by the artist 
and those who purchased his works.200 
The extent of infringement and the likelihood that a lawful 
copyright holder will discover infringement are highly correlated.  
As the potential harm from infringement increases, it becomes 
increasingly likely that a copyright holder will learn of the 
infringing activity.  In the example of the artist’s unauthorized 
creation of Superman comic books, it would be far easier for DC 
Comics to uncover news of the infringement if the artist sold his 
five comic books for $500,000 than it would be if the artist sold his 
creations for $500.  The larger the amount of money changing 
hands, the greater the probability of public knowledge of the 
transaction, and consequently, the greater the likelihood that the 
copyright holder will learn of the transaction involving the 
infringing article. 
 
 197 Lawrence Lessig, Re-Crafting a Public Domain, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 56, 62 
(2006). 
 198 See id. 
 199 See id. at 63. 
 200 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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Conversely, as technology advances, it becomes increasingly 
easy to access copyrighted works intending to violate copyright 
laws.201  While the Internet allows diligent plaintiffs to police 
infringement efficiently, it is impossible to monitor every crevice 
of the Internet vigilantly, particularly because the Internet only 
increases in size over time.  Since 1976, the level of real world, 
practical protection against infringement that lawful creators and 
owners of copyrighted material enjoy has steadily diminished 
because of the concomittant evolution of computer technology.202  
Application of the injury rule to statute of limitations accrual 
calculations in the realm of copyright infringement actions would 
further weaken such protection.203  Lessig notes that Digital Rights 
Management technology is not yet widely used , and there is much 
debate over whether it ever will be.204 As technology advances, 
sophisticated and vigilant copyright holders continue to learn of 
instances of infringement more quickly, which in turn works, from 
a practical standpoint, to diminish the importance of the difference 
between the accrual standards of the discovery rule and the injury 
rule.  Technological advancement, however, also makes it more 
difficult for rights holders to stridently police and protect their 
copyrights.  The more liberal accrual methodology of the discovery 
rule is more effective than the restrictive injury rule in ameliorating 
the policing difficulties that technological advancements 
precipitate. 
iii. Leveling the Playing Field 
On a truly level litigation playing field, defendants should be 
able to mount the best defense possible at trial.205  In order to 
further such strong defenses, policies must protect unsuspecting 
potential defendants who unwittingly fail to preserve evidence that 
 
 201 See Britton Payne, Super-Grokster: Untangling Secondary Liability, Comic Book 
Heroes and the DMCA, and a Filtering Solution for Infringing Digital Creations, 
16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 939, 947–52 (2006) (discussing the 
Copyright Act of 1976, its deficiencies in the face of technology, and how it has tried to 
adapt). 
 202 Id. 
 203 Looking at peer-to-peer sharing software, torrents and Napster-like entities, it 
becomes apparent that copyright infringement has increased. 
 204 Lessig, supra note 197, at 63. 
 205 Malveaux, supra note 185, at 78. 
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would aid their cause from covertly litigious plaintiffs who amass 
substantial amounts of evidence before filing suit.206  As addressed 
supra, most evidence of copyright infringement exists inherently 
within a given allegedly infringing work.  Adoption of one accrual 
rule over another is immaterial and unrelated to the availability of 
such tangible evidence of infringement.  Litigants, however, rely 
on additional evidence in order to prove or disprove infringement.  
When the allegations in a copyright infringement action do not 
pertain to direct copying, for example, the defendant’s access, or 
lack thereof, to the works the defendant allegedly infringed 
becomes an important consideration.207  In such a case, plaintiffs 
may preserve evidence of the defendant’s access to the allegedly 
infringed works, while unknowing eventual defendants discard 
evidence disproving such access.  Even the issue of such other 
evidence, however, is irrelevant in weighing which accrual rule to 
apply, because when plaintiffs preserve evidence of infringement, 
they simultaneously demonstrate knowledge of infringement, 
thereby commencing accrual of the statute of limitations under the 
discovery rule.  Consequently, both the injury rule and the 
discovery rule level the playing field for defendants by 
discouraging plaintiffs from clandestinely gathering and preserving 
evidence long before commencing litigation.  In the context of a 
level playing field, the different accrual methods of the two rules 
are irrelevant. 
2. Efficiency Concerns 
Courts promote efficiency through reducing costs, clearing 
dockets, and making judicial determinations simple and easy to 
decide.208 
a) Reduction of Costs 
Another aim of implementing a statute of limitations is 
reducing the transaction costs inherent to the process of gathering 
 
 206 See id. at 79. 
 207 Herzog v. Castle Rock Entm’t, 193 F.3d 1241, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 208 Malveaux, supra note 185, at 79. 
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evidence.209  As the time span between an instance of infringement 
and commencement of litigation related to this infringement 
grows, the transaction costs of gathering evidence necessary for 
litigation balloon.210  As discussed supra, tangible evidence of 
copyright infringement is typically not difficult to obtain, so the 
transaction costs associated with acquiring such evidence are 
already relatively low.  Consequently, adoption of one accrual rule 
over the other would have little effect on reducing the already low 
transaction costs associated with gathering evidence in copyright 
infringement actions. 
b) Clear Dockets 
Courts also foster efficiency by reducing their heavy 
caseloads.211  They achieve this aim through curtailing the 
proliferation of excessive filings and frivolous claims.212  While in 
the example of the artist’s infringement of copyrights relating to 
Superman DC Comics’ claims are meritorious, most claims 
plaintiffs initiate years after an instance of unlawful conduct do not 
share this distinction.  As a general proposition, the greater the 
time span between allegedly unlawful conduct and the filing of a 
suit related to such conduct, the greater the likelihood that the 
claims in the suit are frivolous.213  Under the discovery rule, 
plaintiffs can file suit twenty years after an instance of copyright 
infringement, so long as they first knew or should have known of 
such infringement no more than three years prior to their 
commencement of litigation.  The discovery rule thus cuts against 
the aspirations of efficiency inherent in the adoption of a statute of 
limitations.  The injury rule is far better suited to clearing court 
dockets and inhibiting the filing of frivolous claims, and is 
therefore more likely to promote efficiency. 
 
 209 Id. 
 210 Id. 
 211 Id. at 79–80. 
 212 Id. at 80. 
 213 Id. 
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c) Simple Judicial Determinations 
A clear rule that precludes plaintiffs from filing claims once a 
finite period has elapsed provides courts with “structure and 
clarity.”214  When courts apply the discovery rule, they forfeit the 
luxury of such a lucid methodology, replacing a concrete 
determination of when infringement first occurred with an 
inherently ambiguous pronouncement on when a plaintiff first 
knew or should have known of an instance of infringement.  In the 
example of the artist’s infringement of DC Comics’ Superman 
copyrights, how would a court determine when DC Comics first 
knew or should have known of the artist’s infringement?  One 
might conclude that even the most prudent plaintiff would not 
learn of the artist’s infringement until the eBay auction.  Many 
Internet sites, however, host web-columns chronicling insider 
information pertaining to comic books.  One such web-column is 
“lying in the gutters.”215  If this web-column posted an article 
about the artist’s five unique comic books shortly after the artist 
initially created these works, does the information in the column 
constitute sufficient notice to commence accrual of the statute of 
limitations under the discovery rule?216  Should courts task 
plaintiffs with the responsibility of knowing about infringement of 
their copyrights even when the only news of such infringement 
comes from obscure or unreliable sources?  Adoption of the 
discovery rule encourages excessive ambiguity in responding to 
these questions, eviscerates the prospect of simple judicial 
determinations, and fosters a lack of uniformity between similar 
cases.  Alternatively, the injury rule furnishes a clear, unambiguous 
standard that fosters clarity, certainty, and consistency in judicial 
determinations. 
 
 214 Id. at 81. 
 215 Rich Johnston, Lying in the Gutters, COMIC BOOK RESOURCES, http://www.comic 
bookresources.com/columns/index.cgi?column=litg (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
 216 A judge may determine that the posting of this web-column is sufficient notice that a 
plaintiff could have known of the infringement, and, therefore, is barred under the 
discovery rule.  Alternately, a judge could argue that one web-column, in such a vast 
forum like the Internet, is not enough notice to bar a claim. 
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3. Institutional Legitimacy 
In order for the legal system to function properly, the public 
must believe that well-founded rules underlie the system and 
protect it from the specter of judicial whim.217  Limitation of an 
individual judge’s discretion promotes legitimacy throughout the 
judicial system.  While the discovery rule curtails an individual 
judge’s discretion to a certain extent, the unambiguous 
methodology of the injury rule is better suited to minimize the 
prospect of judicial prejudice.  Equally important to the 
institutional legitimacy of the judicial system, however, is the 
system’s ability to ensure that it does not exclude plaintiffs with 
valid claims from the legal process.218  Plaintiffs with meritorious 
claims whom the system precludes from persisting with litigation 
will become disillusioned with the judicial system.219  Adoption of 
the discovery rule precludes fewer claims than use of the injury 
rule.  Consequently, the discovery rule may better serve this 
second aim of institutional legitimacy.  Ultimately, the weighing of 
institutional legitimacy concerns requires careful balancing.  If 
courts adopt the plaintiff-friendly discovery rule, they risk 
precariously exposing the rule of the legal system to judicial whim.  
If, however, they instead implement the injury rule more favorable 
to defendants, in so doing they could hamper the administration of 
truly equitable justice. 
Perhaps acting in conformance with Congress’ intent is the best 
means of furthering the legitimacy of the judicial system, for under 
this approach, the citizenry would likely attribute any perceived 
shortcomings of the legal system to the petulantly intractable will 
of Congress, rather than intransigent judges.  Citizens upset about a 
given legal rule will address their displeasure to their elected 
officials rather than the judiciary, since if a legal rule emanates 
from Congress, Congress is responsible for the rule’s existence.  In 
applying such a rule, the judiciary could assert that it is merely 
 
 217 See Malveaux, supra note 185, at 81.  If our judicial system is illegitimate then 
society would not follow the courts and could, in our democratic system, ask Congress 
and the Executive to limit judicial power.  The Executive, in particular, can limit judicial 
power by refusing to enforce the Judiciary’s decisions. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
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doing its job by following Congress’s mandates.  The burden to 
make changes to such a rule would fall squarely on Congress.  This 
passing-the-buck approach to maintaining judicial legitimacy, like 
the Auscape court’s analysis of legislative intent—with which it 
shares many similarities—would favor adoption of the injury rule 
for statute of limitations accrual calculations in the context of 
copyright infringement actions. 
4. Policy Conclusion 
On the whole, the injury rule is better-tailored to address the 
aforementioned policy concerns than the discovery rule.  Adoption 
of the injury rule offers the prospect of clear, unambiguous, and 
uniform accrual calculations without impinging on considerations 
that originally led Congress to impose a statute of limitations on 
copyright infringement actions.  Application of the discovery rule 
would only detract from such aspirations. 
D. Are the Goals of Copyright Law Better Served by a Particular 
Rule? 
Copyright law aims to “balance the interests of creators 
protecting their works and the constitutionally mandated public 
interest in the advancement of technology.”220  As copyright law 
has evolved, it has enabled rights holders to protect their 
copyrights with increasing ease.221  Technological advancements, 
however, have fostered a commensurate increase in the degree of 
ease with which unlawful actors can infringe upon copyrighted 
works.222 
1. The Injury Rule and the Goals of Copyright Law 
It remains unclear whether imposition of the injury rule would 
further either of the goals of copyright law.  Working under the 
shadow of the pro-defendant injury rule, creators might become 
less inclined to produce works, knowing that once they complete 
their works they will have to exhibit extreme vigilance if they wish 
 
 220 Payne, supra note 201, at 945–46. 
 221 Id. at 946–47. 
 222 Id. at 947. 
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to monitor and police effectively unlawful appropriation and 
infringement of the copyrights they hold in their works.  Moreover, 
the injury may not even foster the goal of advancing the arts and 
sciences.  This aim stems from the notion that those who seek to 
create new works may need to utilize older works in order to create 
something new.223  Mandating that copyrights expire after a period 
of reasonable duration allows aspiring creators to either contract 
for the right to produce a work derived from or premised on an 
older work, or else wait until the older work enters the public 
domain before commencing work on their derivative creations.224  
Adoption of the injury rule appears at first glance to reward 
technologically advanced copyright infringers at the expense of 
promoting the legal advancement of technology, but perhaps 
copyright holders aware of the injury rule would be more likely to 
grant aspiring creators rights to produce works derived from or 
premised on their copyrighted works through contract in 
anticipation of the fact that if they failed to do so, these aspiring 
creators might well become actual infringers.  Fears over the 
impossibility of effectively policing infringement on the part of 
copyright holders could thus engender a wider and more prevalent 
distribution of rights to copyrighted works, and in so doing lead to 
technological advancements.  Furthermore, when copyright holders 
contract away some of the rights in their works to other parties, the 
various parties share the burden of protecting such works from 
infringement.  Thus, on some level, the injury rule could further 
the advancement of technology. 
2. The Discovery Rule and the Goals of Copyright Law 
While adoption of the discovery rule may not foster 
technological advancement, it certainly would increase the quotient 
of statutory infringement protection copyright holders enjoy.  
Judicial implementation of the discovery rule would engender 
stringent protection of copyrighted works by allowing copyright 
 
 223 Melanie Costantino, Fairly Used: Why Google’s Book Project Should Prevail under 
the Fair Use Defense, 17 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235 (2006). 
 224 See Ashok Chandra, Crisis of Indefinite Consequence: How Derivative Works 
Exception and the Lanham Act Undercut the Remunerative Value of Termination of 
Transfers, 16 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 241, 250 (2005). 
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owners to commence litigation once they learn of infringement, 
rather than at the time of infringement, or shortly thereafter.  
Would such increased protection tip the scales, disturbing the 
precarious balance between protecting individual rights and 
advancing technology that courts diligently attempt to maintain in 
the realm of copyright?  Interestingly enough, the answer is no.  
Because of the sophistication of the actors in the copyright market, 
adoption of the discovery rule would not drastically change the 
timeframe within which plaintiffs are able to bring claims.  If 
adoption of the discovery rule would expand the timeframe within 
which plaintiffs could file copyright infringement suits at all, it 
would do so only slightly, as courts would rule under almost all 
circumstances that sophisticated plaintiffs learned—or else 
reasonably should have learned—of any instances of substantial 
infringement well within the three-year time limit the Copyright 
Act’s statute of limitations imposes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Note examined the costs and benefits of adopting either 
the discovery rule or the injury rule for statute of limitations 
accrual calculations in the context of copyright infringement 
actions.  Courts following the precedent of the majority of circuit 
courts and the decisions of the Supreme Court narrowly would 
likely adopt the discovery rule.225  Conversely, courts weighing 
only the effect of a particular accrual rule on statute of limitations 
policy concerns would likely embrace the injury rule, based upon 
the dual goals of copyright law: protection of individual creative 
rights and the advancement of the arts and sciences for the benefit 
of society.226  While technological advances have made it easier 
for rights holders to police infringement of their copyrights, these 
very same advances have also made it much easier for infringers to 
access and appropriate copyrighted materials.  Adopting the 
discovery rule redoubles only slightly the aspects of copyright 
protection that technological advancements have already whittled 
away. 
 
 225 See supra Part IV(A)(1) and accompanying notes. 
 226 See supra Part IV(C)(4) and accompanying notes. 
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The most important goal of any statute of limitations, however, 
is repose.  While adoption of the discovery rule renders repose 
slightly more difficult to attain, as technology continues to 
advance, plaintiffs will find themselves hard-pressed to present 
claims of infringement that occurred twenty years ago premised on 
assertions that they did not and should not have known of the 
alleged infringement earlier.  The discovery rule’s affect on repose 
is thus minimal, and the potential benefits derived from adoption 
of this rule outweigh any potentially adverse effects.  
Consequently, courts should adopt the discovery rule for statute of 
limitations accrual calculations in the context of copyright 
infringement claims in order to protect lawful copyright holders to 
the most thorough extent possible. 
Our hearts may not go out to DC Comics and its inability to 
bring a claim against a single artist, especially since DC Comics is 
a subsidiary of Time Warner, a major corporation.  But if the artist 
instead appropriated copyrights pertaining to the most popular 
character in a fledgling comic company’s roster, both the 
infringement itself and its effect on comic book company’s 
business would be far more significant.  As this Note addressed 
previously, questions implicating statute of limitations accrual 
concerns do not arise often in the context of copyright 
infringement actions.  In some cases this Note examined, the 
question of the applicable rule of accrual was inconsequential.  In 
others, adoption of one accrual rule over another affected whether 
damages were awarded.  The question of the applicable accrual 
rule proved dispositive in only a few cases, but these few cases do 
in fact matter.  In order to grow and flourish, the aforementioned 
fledgling comic books company must be capable of stridently 
protecting its copyrights.  Big corporations rarely suffer damage 
from anything but the most rampant, unrestrained infringement, 
particularly since they have the greatest amount of resources with 
which to police potential copyright violations.  It is the cases 
involving the upstart creator, the fresh-faced musician, and the 
young computer programmer where the accrual issue is truly of 
great import.  Copyright law strives to promote the arts and 
sciences while protecting intellectual property.  The arts and 
sciences cannot advance if the law fails to safeguard the 
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intellectual property rights of the upstarts, dreamers, and 
entrepreneurs, those most in need of the law’s protection. 
